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1. Introduction  
Indigenous peoples have a distinctive and profound relationship with their lands, 
territories and resources. This relationship, which is at the core of indigenous societies,1 
has social, cultural, spiritual, economic and political dimensions.2 Furthermore, for 
indigenous peoples the land ‘is not a commodity which can be acquired, 3 but, rather, 
something that should be enjoyed freely and collectively. It is clear, therefore, that 
indigenous peoples have a unique understanding of how ‘human beings should live on 
the earth’,4 and that respect for their lands, territories and resources becomes key for 
their continued survival and vitality. Understandably, this alternative approach to 
existence is at odds with the modern global market which fully endorses the concept of 
‘never-ending exponential growth.’5 Exploiting natural resources and expanding the 
relevant supportive infrastructures are crucial to achieving permanent growth. Since 
many of these natural resources are found on lands traditionally owned and controlled 
by indigenous peoples, an inevitable conflict between competing claims and interests 
erupts.6 Given the disparity of power of the parties to the dispute, economic and 
                                                
1 As one indigenous representative put it: ‘the issue for indigenous peoples is the land; indigenous 
peoples are one with the land.’ Statement by William Means, in Voices of Indigenous Peoples: Native 
People Address the United Nations, ed. A. Ewen (Santa Fe New Mexico: Clear Light, 1994) 60. 
2 ‘Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship to Land’, Final Working Paper prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (11 June 2001), para. 12. 
3 Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, Volume V Conclusions, 
Proposals and Recommendations, by Jose’ R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, paras. 196 and 197. 
4 J. Mander and V. Tauli-Corpus (ed.), Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to 
Globalization’, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2006) 3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 This conflict is well captured by the words of the former President of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz: ‘Let’s face it: the survival of authentic indigenous tradition 
is diametrically opposed to economic globalization. One is based on true sustainability through a 
nuanced harmony with Nature’s cycles; the other values nothing other than how natural resources 
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industrial development has traditionally taken place without recognition of and respect 
for indigenous peoples’ cultural attachment to their lands.7 As a consequence, an 
increasing number of indigenous communities around the world have found themselves 
‘in a state of rapid deterioration.’8 
 International human rights law has acknowledged and addressed this problem. 
In recent decades a growing number of international human rights bodies have 
elaborated legal principles and standards designed particularly to protect indigenous 
peoples. At the same time, various international instruments have recognized, either 
incidentally or specifically, a vast range of rights to indigenous groups. As a result of 
these two conjunct processes, a strong and effective regime of indigenous peoples’ 
rights has gradually emerged at the international level.9 Within this regime, two rights 
are key to the protection of the special relationship that indigenous peoples have with 
their lands, namely the right to self-determination and the right to collectively own 
ancestral lands. Considering the far-reaching implications of these two rights, it is not 
surprising that a number of controversies as to their actual meaning and methods of 
implementation have remained partially unresolved.  
One nebulous area, in particular, refers to the legal regime that should govern the 
implementation of development projects on indigenous peoples’ lands. Central to this 
debate is the concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), which is currently 
invoked by virtually all bodies dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights. According to 
the ‘common practical understanding’ of FPIC elaborated by the UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues,10 the concept of FPIC can be explained as follows.11 
                                                                                                                                      
translate to the bottom line. One benefits the community and stretched far into the future; the other 
benefits only a few, and only until resources are depleted.’ Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Our Right to 
Remain Separate and Distinct, in Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Globalization, 
supra note 5, 20.  
7 ‘The expropriation of indigenous lands and resources for national development is a growing and 
severe problem. Development projects are frequently undertaken on indigenous lands and territories 
without indigenous consent or even consultation.’ ‘Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship to Land’, 
supra note 3, para. 132. 
8 Ibid., para, 123. As observed by one indigenous representative: ‘there is a race between “profits now” 
and the survival of our grandchildren. There is a race between common sense and the world market. 
The race is in progress; this generation and the next will determine the outcome. Who will write that 
epilogue?’ O. Lyons, Epilogue, in Voices of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2, 124.  
9 See, among others, P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester: MUP, 2002), 
J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004); A. Xanthaki, Indigenous 
Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture, and Land (Cambridge: CUP, 
2007); A. Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievement in International Law During the Last 
Quarter of a Century’ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 37 (2006), 155. 
10 The Forum is an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council (Council). It provides 
expert advice and recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council, as well as to programmes, 
funds and agencies of the United Nations (through the Council). It also prepares and disseminates 
information on indigenous issues related to economic and social development, culture, the 
environment, education, health and human rights, and promotes the integration and coordination of 
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Firstly, ‘free’ should imply no coercion, intimidation or manipulation. Secondly, 
‘prior’ should imply that consent must be sought sufficiently in advance of any 
authorization or commencement of activities, and that the relevant agents should 
guarantee enough time for the indigenous consultation/consensus processes to take 
place. Thirdly, ‘informed’ implies that indigenous peoples should receive satisfactory 
information in relation to certain key areas, including the nature, size, pace, 
reversibility and scope of the proposed project, the reasons for launching it, its 
duration, and a preliminary assessment of its economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impact. Crucially, this information should be accurate and in a form 
that is accessible, meaning that indigenous peoples should fully understand the 
language used. Finally, ‘consent’ should be intended as a process of which 
consultation and participation represent the central pillars. While consultation should 
be undertaken in good faith, full and equitable participation of indigenous peoples 
should be guaranteed. Indigenous peoples should also have equal access to financial, 
human and material resources in order to engage constructively in this discussion. 
Moreover, they should be able to participate through their own freely chosen 
representatives and according to their customs.  
The above description clearly identifies the various phases and components of 
FPIC intended as a process of consultation and participation. However, it is silent as 
to the outcome of this very process.12  What remains to be established, therefore, is 
whether the concept of FPIC imposes on States an obligation to obtain the consent of 
indigenous peoples before initiating, or authorizing, development projects on their 
lands.13 The majority of States would understandably answer this question in the 
                                                                                                                                      
activities related to indigenous issues within the UN system. See 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about_us.html. [last visited 9 March 2011] 
11 Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
and Indigenous Peoples (New York, 17-19 January 2005), UN Doc. E/C.19/2005/3, para. 45. 
12 The report rather elusively notes that FIPC ‘may include the option of withholding consent’. 
However, it does not further elaborate on this point. Ibid., para. 47. 
13 It has been correctly observed that discussions over FPIC should not be ‘framed in terms of whether 
or not indigenous peoples hold a veto power that they could wield to halt development projects.’ 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya (15 July 2009), UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 48. That said, the 
question as to whether indigenous peoples may enjoy such a right must be specifically addressed, for 
the potential recognition of this right has important implications with respect to the manner in which 
the broader process of consultation is conducted. In particular, taking part in consultations knowing 
that one will hardly be able to oppose the outcome of the process is one thing; doing so with the 
awareness that the final decision might be successfully affected, or even rejected, is quite another. By 
virtue of a right ‘to say no’, indigenous peoples could exercise a more effective control over the 
various stages of the consultation process. For a discussion, see L. Laplante   and S. Spears, Out of the 
Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, Yale Human 
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negative. In their view, the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights ‘must 
[necessarily] be balanced by the need for Governments to own or regulate resources 
in the interests of all their citizens.’14  This means that indigenous peoples should not 
have the power to block projects that are considered of strategic importance for the 
development of the entire country. Having said that, to deny indigenous peoples the 
right to oppose decisions related to their lands that could have a negative impact on 
their cultures and lives would be illogical and incoherent in the light of the existing 
regime of indigenous rights. As explained above, indigenous peoples are primarily 
characterized by the special attachment to their lands. This means that protecting this 
cultural element becomes necessary in order to protect their very existence. It follows 
that to allow development projects on indigenous lands regardless of the 
consequences that they might have on indigenous cultures and lives risks to 
undermine the very purpose of the indigenous rights regime that has recently emerged 
at the international level. 
This article seeks to shed some light on this specific question by considering 
the status of FPIC under the indigenous rights regime, particularly after the adoption 
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).15 The next 
section will offer an overview of international legal standards on FPIC. Special 
attention will be paid to environmental law instruments, the policies of the World 
Bank16 concerning indigenous peoples, and the relevant provisions of International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169, namely the only international 
legally binding instrument concerning indigenous rights still open to ratification. 
Section three will consider how human rights treaty bodies have dealt with FPIC 
within the limits of their respective normative frameworks. Following on that, section 
four will focus on the key instrument of the indigenous rights regime, that is, the 
UNDRIP, analysing the content of its specific provision on FPIC and development 
                                                                                                                                      
Rights & Development Law Journal, 11 (2008), 69. See also Report of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations in its 7th Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36, para 62. 
14 This point was highlighted by the representative of New Zealand during the negotiations on the text 
of the declaration. Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration on its 5th session, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/84, para 93.  
15 FPIC relates to several areas, including cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, genetic resources, 
displacement, and legislative measures in general. However, this article will focus exclusively on the 
issue of development projects taking place on indigenous lands. 
16 Formally, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, established as a result of the 
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. The World Bank Group is composed of four additional 
institutions that work together towards the transfer of resources and promotion of investment for 
development countries. See, G. Loibl, International Economic Law, in International Law (2nd ed, 
Oxford: OUP, 2006) ed. M. Evans, 694-698. 
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projects. Subsequently, section five will discuss the contribution of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights to the elaboration and clarification of the concept 
of FPIC developed by the UNDRIP. Finally, section six will seek to draw some 
general conclusions. 
 
 
2. An Overview of International Legal Standards 
As explained in the introductory section, the manner in which consultation and 
participation should be conducted in order for the consent of indigenous peoples to be 
free, prior and informed is relatively clear. By contrast, doubts remain as to whether 
States must obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before launching development 
projects on their lands. An analysis of international legal standards related to FPIC 
fully confirms the difficulty of providing a decisive answer to this crucial question. 
 
 
2.1 International Environmental Law 
The importance of public participation has been increasingly recognized in the sphere 
of international environmental law. As observed by Pring and Noe, ‘public 
participation promises to define and redefine the major economic development 
projects of the Twenty-first century - and few sectors will be more impacted on by 
this than the mining, energy, and resources-development industries.’17 
 This trend has become even more significant in respect of indigenous peoples 
in view of their special cultural attachment to ancestral lands. Key instruments in the 
sphere of international environmental law do not refer directly to FPIC. However, 
they demand that the spiritual relationship existing between indigenous peoples and 
their lands be respected. In particular, these instruments recognise indigenous 
peoples’ important contribution to sustainable development,18 and call for the 
                                                
17 G. Pring and S. Noe, The Emerging International Law of Public Participation Affecting Global 
Mining, Energy, and Resources Development, in Human Rights in Natural Resources Development, 
Public Participation in the Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources, ed. D.N. 
Zillman, A. R. Lucas and G. Pring (Oxford: OUP 2002) 11-12. 
18 The concept of sustainable development is based on three pillars: economic development, social 
development and environmental protection. It posits that environmental protection constitutes an 
integral part of the development process and, therefore, should not be considered in isolation from it. 
In addition, it requires that economic welfare be assessed also on the basis of non-financial 
components including, for example, the quality of the environment and the health conditions of the 
people concerned. For an overview, see D. McGoldrick, Sustainable Development and Human Rights: 
 6 
protection of their traditional cultures and lifestyles. With this in mind, a purposive 
interpretation of their provisions would suggest that States should obtain the consent 
of indigenous peoples before initiating development projects on their lands. 
Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, for example, emphasizes that indigenous 
people ‘have a vital role in environmental management and development because of 
their knowledge and traditional practices.’19 Accordingly, it demands that States 
‘recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their 
effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.’ If sustainable 
development is the final goal, and indigenous peoples play a crucial role in achieving 
it by virtue of their traditional cultures and practices, to allow development projects 
which do not have the support of the indigenous peoples concerned would seem to 
defeat the spirit of the instrument. 
Similarly, Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 affirms that the lands of indigenous 
peoples ‘should be protected from activities that are environmentally unsound or that 
the indigenous people concerned consider to be socially and culturally inappropriate’, 
and that the cultural, economic and physical well-being of indigenous peoples depend 
on their ‘traditional and direct dependence on renewable resources and ecosystems, 
including sustainable harvesting.’20 Agenda 21 also expressly recognizes that 
traditional knowledge and resource management practices are key to promoting 
environmentally sound and sustainable development. As in the case of the Rio 
Declaration, to give States the green light in relation to development projects that fail 
to obtain the consent and support of indigenous peoples would seem to contravene 
the purposes of the document. 
Contrary to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention imposes legal obligations on States parties.21 This convention recognizes 
that indigenous peoples’ knowledge and practices embody ‘traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.’22 
                                                                                                                                      
An Integrated Conception, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1996), 796-818, and A. 
Boyle, C. Redgwell and P. Birnie, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 56. 
19 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
20 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by 
organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which 
human impacts on the environment. It was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992. 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/ [last visited 9 March 2011]. 
21 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(j), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). 
22 Ibid., Article 8(j). 
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Accordingly, it requests that States, subject to their national legislation, respect, 
preserve and maintain such knowledge and practices, and promote their wider 
application with the approval and involvement of the holders. In addition, without 
directly mentioning indigenous peoples, Article 10(c) establishes that each 
contracting party shall ‘protect and encourage customary use of biological resources 
in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation 
or sustainable use requirements.’ Once again, such an emphasis on the importance of 
traditional knowledge and practices would seem hardly reconcilable with a legal 
regime that allows States to impose unwanted and destabilizing development projects 
on indigenous lands without the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
All the above interpretations are in line with the spirit and purpose of the 
concerned instruments, and can hardly be regarded as unsound. At the same time, the 
fact that none of these instruments expressly refers to FPIC cannot be overlooked. For 
this reason, while any attempt to shed light on the controversies related to the FPIC 
should take into account the abovementioned provisions, general environment law 
instruments cannot be expected to provide decisive answers to the complex questions 
concerning FPIC.  
 
 
2.2 The World Bank
23
 
The World Bank (WB or Bank) is one of the most important international economic 
institutions. Its activity is importantly related to the issues of indigenous peoples’ 
land rights and FPIC in that the Bank provides various forms of financial support to 
major development projects that may take place on indigenous lands. The WB has 
been the first multilateral financial institution to establish a safeguards policy on 
indigenous issues.24 Its first engagement with indigenous peoples was in 1982, when 
the Bank adopted a brief operational policy based on the premise that ‘tribal peoples 
are more likely to be harmed than helped by development projects that are intended 
for beneficiaries other than themselves.’25 A process of revision of this policy was 
launched in 1987, leading to the adoption, in 1991, of Operational Directive 4.20. 
                                                
23 For a more detailed discussion of the World Bank’s approach to FPIC, see S. Errico, The World 
Bank and Indigenous Peoples: the Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples (O.P.4.10.) Between 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Traditional Lands and to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 13 (2006), 367–390 
24 S. Errico, supra note, 368. 
25 Tribal Peoples in Bank-Financed Projects, Operational Manual Statement 2.34. 
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Contrary to its predecessor, which was partially informed by an assimilationistic 
approach typical of the time, the new policy recognized the centrality of the principle 
of participation in order to safeguard indigenous peoples' cultures and lives. In 
particular, it stressed that ‘identifying local preferences through direct consultation, 
incorporation of indigenous knowledge into projects approaches, and appropriate 
early use of experienced specialists are core activities for any project that affect rights 
to natural and economic resources.’26  
Even this new policy, however, would soon be revised. After embracing the 
principle of sustainable development in the late 1980s, the WB became gradually 
more concerned with the idea of social and environmental protection. As a result, and 
within a context of a broader process of adaptation, the WB issued a new policy on 
indigenous peoples, namely Operational Policy 4.10, which entered into force in July 
2005.27 The new policy is meant to contribute to the Bank’s mission of poverty 
reduction and sustainable development by ensuring that the development process 
fully respects the dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of indigenous 
peoples. More precisely, the policy recognizes ‘that the identities and cultures of 
indigenous peoples are inextricably linked to the lands on which they live and the 
natural resources on which they depend’. It also acknowledges that ‘these distinct 
circumstances expose indigenous peoples to different types of risks and levels of 
impacts from development projects, including loss of identity, culture, and customary 
livelihoods, as well as exposure to disease.’28  
Following on these premises, the core principle underlying Operational Policy 
4.10 is that, before financing a project that affects indigenous peoples, the bank will 
require the borrower to engage in a process of free, prior, and informed consultation 
with them. More precisely, the aim of the policy is to promote ‘a process of free, 
prior and informed consultation with [the] affected communities that [will lead to] 
broad support for the project.’29 In theory, such a requirement could be quite 
stringent, for it could mean that the WB ‘will not proceed further with project 
processing if it is unable to ascertain that [broad support exists among the affected 
                                                
26 Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples, para. 8. 
27 Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples. 
28 Ibid., para. 2. 
29 Striking a Better Balance – The World Bank and Extractive Industries: The Final Report of the 
Extractive Industries Review, World Bank Group Management Response (17 September 2004), 
available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/eir.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/FinalMgtResponseExecSum/$FILE/finaleirmana
gementresponseexecsum.pdf [last visited 9 March 2011]. 
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communities].’30 The effectiveness of such provisions, however, remains inevitably 
impaired by the use of ambiguous terms such as ‘consultation’ and ‘support’. Indeed 
the very decision to replace the commonly used and more rigorous expression ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ with ‘free, prior and informed consultation’ speaks 
volumes of the intention of the drafters.  
In conclusion, while one may speculate on the actual level of protection that 
this policy guarantees to indigenous peoples, it is fairly clear that the World Bank 
does not recognize that indigenous peoples have the right to decline unwanted 
projects taking place on their lands.  
 
 
2.3 ILO Convention No. 169
31
 
ILO Convention No. 169 (ILO 169 or Convention) is the only international 
instrument concerning the rights of indigenous peoples that produces legally binding 
obligations and is still open to ratification.32 Only twenty-two States have thus far 
ratified this document, a circumstance that raises some doubt as to the legal relevance 
of the convention on a global scale. However, it has been rightly noted that ILO 169’s 
contribution goes beyond the limited number of ratifications,33 for the convention has 
been particularly influential in the process of construction of the indigenous rights 
regime and continues to play a crucial role within it.34  Thus its provisions must be 
                                                
30 Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples (July 2005) para. 11. 
31 ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, text available at 
 <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/indigenous/> [last visited 9 March 2011]. For a detailed analysis 
of ILO’s contribution to the construction of the indigenous rights regime, see L. Rodriguez-Pinero, 
Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: the ILO Regime, supra note 10. 
32 There exists another ILO convention concerning indigenous peoples’ rights, namely ILO 
Convention No. 107 of 1957 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO 107). ILO 107 remains valid for those 
States which, having previously ratified it, decided not to become parties to ILO 169 in 1989. 
However, after the establishment of ILO 169, ILO 107 was declared closed for ratification. Besides the 
limited number of ratifications, the deplorable assimilationistic approach of the ILO 107 makes the 
instrument ill suited to accommodate fairly the rights of indigenous peoples. See, for one, J. Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law supra note 10, 54-56. 
33 The ILO Guide on the Convention correctly acknowledges that ILO No. 169 ‘may be used as a tool 
to stimulate dialogue between governments and indigenous and tribal peoples, and in this way, to 
improve their situation.’ Thus if one intends to appreciate the importance of the instrument, she should 
not focus on its legal dimension, but rather consider the promotional role it has exercised. See ‘ILO 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989 (No. 169): A Manual’ (International Labour 
Office, Geneva 2003) Foreword. 
34 In Anaya’s words, ILO 169 represents ‘a central feature of international law’s contemporary 
treatment of indigenous peoples’ demands.’ J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra 
note 10, 58. 
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carefully examined for they may provide important indications on how FPIC is to be 
interpreted in the context of the indigenous rights regime. 
ILO 169 fully acknowledges and protects the special relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their lands. Article 13, in particular, establishes that 
governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values 
of indigenous peoples of their relationship with their lands. Accordingly, the 
convention recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to own their lands,35 and to 
‘exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural 
development.’36  
One of the key provisions of ILO 169 is found in Article 6, which introduces 
the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted and to freely participate at all levels of 
decision-making when policies and programmes might affect them.37 The importance 
of this article is confirmed by the fact that the rights to consultation and participation 
have been described as the cornerstone of ILO 169 by the monitoring body of the 
convention.38 In order to appreciate the significance of this provision in relation to 
FPIC one has to read it in combination with Article 15. This provision establishes that 
indigenous peoples’ rights to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be 
specially safeguarded, and that these rights include the right to participate in the use, 
management and conservation of these resources. However, Article 15 also 
recognizes that States may retain the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources 
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands. In such cases, the Convention requests 
that governments consult indigenous peoples ‘with a view to ascertaining whether 
and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or 
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources 
pertaining to their lands.’39  
This passage could be read as introducing a link between the level of 
protection to be accorded to indigenous peoples and the seriousness of the impact of a 
                                                
35 Article 14. 
36 Article 7. 
37 Article 6(1). 
38 ‘The spirit of consultation and participation constitutes the cornerstone of Convention ILO No. 169 
on which all its provisions are based.’ Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation 
alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 
169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederacion Ecuatoriana de 
Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), para. 31. 
39 Article 15(2). The same provision adds that indigenous peoples ‘shall wherever possible participate 
in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may 
sustain as a result of such activities.’  
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particular programme. However, the ILO Governing Body has put a clear limit to the 
relevant degree of protection, excluding that States should obtain the consent of 
indigenous peoples prior to the implementation of a development project.40 
Consultations should nevertheless be conducted with a view to finding ‘appropriate 
solutions in an atmosphere of mutual respect and full participation,’41 and indigenous 
peoples should have ‘a realistic chance of affecting the outcome’42 of the relevant 
process. Thus, it could be argued that ILO 169 takes a pragmatic approach to FPIC, 
seeking to empower indigenous peoples without, however, going as far as granting  
them a veto power. 
 
 
3. United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
International human rights treaties do not refer expressly to FPIC. Crucially, they also 
lack any express reference to indigenous peoples’ rights. However, the bodies 
entrusted to monitor and promote their implementation have gradually developed 
extensive interpretations of their generic provisions in order to protect, inter alia, the 
special cultural attachment of indigenous peoples to their lands. This is particularly 
true with regard to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Human Rights Committee. The following analysis will offer an overview of the 
practice of these three bodies in relation to FPIC. 
 
 
3.1 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), that is, the 
organ created to monitor and promote compliance with the International Convention 
                                                
40 See ILO Governing Body, 282nd Session, November 2001, representation under Article 24 of the 
ILO Constitution, GB.282/14/2, para. 39. On this point, see also the Contribution of the ILO to the 
Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent organized by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, New York, 17-19 January 2005, para. 12, where it is stressed that ILO 169 does not require that 
the consent of indigenous peoples to the proposed measures is necessary. Available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/workshopFPIC.html [last visited 9 March 2011] 
41 GB.282/14/2, supra note 52, para. 36. 
42 ‘[ILO 169] requires that procedures be in place whereby indigenous and tribal peoples have a 
realistic chance of affecting the outcome.’ Contribution of the ILO, supra note 42.
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),43 has 
traditionally played an active role in promoting the rights of indigenous peoples, 
especially in relation to their ancestral lands.44 With regard to the issue of 
participation and consultation, CERD has stressed that no decisions directly relating 
to the rights and interests of indigenous peoples should be taken without their 
informed consent.45 Obviously, this principle applies also in relation to the 
implementation of development projects on indigenous lands. On occasions CERD 
has taken a mild approach to FPIC, recommending State parties to ‘endeavor to 
obtain’, 46 or ‘seek’,47 the consent of indigenous peoples, or simply referring to a 
‘right to prior consultation’ of indigenous peoples.48 However, the tendency, 
particularly after the adoption of the UNDRIP, has been to promote a more rigorous 
understanding of FPIC. Accordingly, in numerous concluding observations on States’ 
reports CERD has stressed that States should obtain the consent of indigenous 
peoples before a project can take place on their lands.49  
 
 
 
                                                
43 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 
(XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
44 CERD has called upon States parties ‘to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to 
own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources.’ It has also demanded 
that, where indigenous peoples have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or 
otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, States should take steps to return 
those lands and territories. CERD General Recommendation N. 23 on Indigenous Peoples (18 August 
1997), para. 5, available at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/73984290dfea022b802565160056fe1c?Opendocument>. 
[last visited 9 March 2011]. For an overview of the practice of CERD in relation to indigenous rights 
see P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, supra note 10. 
45 States parties should ‘ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of 
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests 
are taken without their informed consent. CERD General Recommendation N. 23, supra note, para. 
4(d). 
46 
CERD/C/GTM/CO/11 (15 May 2006) Guatemala, para. 19. 
47 CERD/C/GUY/CO/14  (4 April 2006) Guyana, para. 14. 
48 CERD/C/COL/CO/14 (28 August 2009) Colombia, para. 20. 
49
 For example, CERD demanded that Chile ‘hold effective consultations with indigenous peoples on 
all projects related to their ancestral lands’ and ‘obtain their consent prior to implementation of 
projects for the extraction of natural resources, in accordance with international standards.’ 
CERD/C/CHL/CO/15-18 (7 September 2009) para. 22. Similarly, it urged Guatemala to ‘consult the 
indigenous population groups concerned at each stage of the process’ and ‘to obtain their consent 
before executing projects involving the extraction of natural resources.’ CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13, (19 
May 2010) para. 11. On another occasion, CERD condemned the fact that the ‘right of indigenous 
peoples to be consulted and to give their informed consent prior to the exploitation of natural resources 
in their territories is not fully respected.’ CERD/C/PER/CO/14-17 (3 September 2009) para. 14. 
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3.2 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body that 
monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).50 CESCR has been less proactive than CERD in 
promoting indigenous rights and elaborating new legal standards related to 
indigenous peoples.51 For the purposes of this article, however, it is relevant that the 
CESCR has regularly dealt with the issue of FPIC. In doing so, the CESCR has 
refrained from expressly demanding that States obtain the consent of indigenous 
peoples prior to the implementation of development projects on their lands. More 
cautiously, it has noted on a number occasions that States should merely consult and 
seek such consent.52  
That said, CESCR seems to have revisited its approach to FPIC following the 
adoption of the UNDRIP.  In 2009 it issued a general comment on the right to take part 
in cultural life enshrined in Article 15(a) of the ICESCR. 53 In listing the core 
obligations that States parties have to respect in order to ensure the satisfaction of this 
right, the CESCR noted that they should ‘allow and encourage the participation of 
persons belonging to minority groups, indigenous peoples or to other communities in 
the design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them.’54 More 
importantly, it also specified that: 
 
‘States parties should obtain their free and informed prior consent when the preservation 
of their cultural resources, especially those associated with their way of life and cultural 
expression, are at risk.’55 
 
                                                
50 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
51 For an overview of the practice of the CESCR in relation to indigenous rights see P. Thornberry, 
Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, supra note 10. 
52 For example, in 2001 it urged Colombia ‘to consult and seek the consent of the indigenous peoples 
concerned prior to the implementation of timber, soil or subsoil mining projects and on any public 
policy affecting them.’ E/C.12/1/Add.74, para. 33. Likewise, in 2004, it requested Ecuador ‘to 
consult and seek the consent of the indigenous people concerned prior to the implementation of natural 
resources-extracting projects and on public policy affecting them.’ E/C.12/1/Add.100, para. 35. In 
2006, it asked Mexico to ensure that the indigenous peoples ‘are duly consulted, and their prior 
informed consent is sought.’ E/C.12/MEX/CO/4, para. 28. 
53 General Comment No. 21, Right of Everyone to take Part in Cultural Life, E/C.12/GC/21 (21 
December 2009). 
54 Ibid., para. 55(e). 
55 My emphasis. Ibid. In another passage, the Committee stressed that ‘States parties should respect the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters covered by their 
specific rights.’ Ibid., para. 37. 
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In other words, the CESCR requests a stronger level of protection in respect of those 
measures that might have serious negative effects on the way of life of indigenous 
peoples. Crucially, such measures should only be taken with the consent of the 
communities concerned. Following this general comment, the Committee has 
recommended States to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples,56 but has also 
requested them to conduct consultations in accordance with ILO 169, which, as 
discussed in section 2.3, excludes that indigenous peoples may enjoy a right to veto.
57 
Since the Committee has not further elaborated on the important principle introduced 
by the above general comment, it is not totally clear under what circumstances it will 
demand a more rigorous degree of protection.  
 
 
3.3 The Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is entrusted to monitor compliance with the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).58 It was the first 
human rights treaty body to deal regularly and substantially with indigenous issues, 
contributing to a considerable extent to the elaboration of new legal principles and 
standards related to indigenous peoples. The HRC did so by promoting a progressive 
interpretation of the right to culture included in Article 27 of the ICCPR so to secure, 
among others, the right of indigenous peoples to conduct traditional economic 
activities and to live in harmony with their lands and resources.59  
The practice of the HRC in respect of FPIC is indicative of the uncertainties that 
surround the meaning and scope of this controversial principle. A survey of its 
concluding observations on States’ reports suggests that the HRC takes a rather 
prudent approach to FPIC. The committee has called upon States parties to pay 
primary attention to the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions that affect 
                                                
56 E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4, (2010, Sri Lanka) para. 11.  
57 E/C.12/COL/CO/5, para. 9, where the CESCR recommended Colombia to promote FPIC in 
accordance with the normative framework of  ILO Convention No. 169. 
58 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
59 Article 27 protects, among others, the right of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities to enjoy, in community with the other members of their group, their own culture. The HRC 
has promoted an extensive reading of ‘culture’, noting that ‘culture manifests itself in many forms, 
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of 
indigenous peoples.’ See HRC General Comment No. 23, The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), available 
at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument> 
[last visited 9 March 2011] 
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them,60 and to consult indigenous peoples before granting licenses for the economic 
exploitation of their lands.61 On a number of occasions the HRC has sharpened its 
position, noting that States should ensure that this consultation is effective, 62 and that 
it should be conducted with a view to guaranteeing the free, prior and informed 
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned.63 However, it has thus far refrained 
from affirming that States should obtain the consent of indigenous peoples prior to 
the implementation of any such project. 
That said, an analysis of the HRC’s pronouncements in relation to individual 
communications offers a different picture. The case of Ilmari Länsman et al. v. 
Finland is particularly instructive.64 This case dealt with the decision of the Finnish 
Central Forestry Board to pass a contract with a private company to allow stone 
quarrying in a reindeer herding area, home to a Sami community. The applicant 
claimed that this agreement violated the Sami right to enjoy their own culture, 
traditionally based on reindeer husbandry, as established by Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
Importantly, the HRC found that Finland had not violated this provision. In coming to 
this conclusion, the HRC noted that the authors of the communication were consulted 
and their interests were considered during the proceedings leading to the delivery of 
the quarrying permit by the State. This seems to confirm the HRC’s view discussed 
above according to which States should merely seek to consult and seek the consent 
of indigenous of peoples. However, the main reason behind the HRC’s finding that 
no violation of Article 27 had occurred was that quarrying, in the amount that had 
taken place at the time, had only a limited impact on the way of life of the concerned 
communities, and thus did not amount to a denial of their rights. Accordingly, in the 
eventuality of a more substantial impact on the way of life of the indigenous 
communities concerned, it is plausible that the HRC would have demanded more than 
                                                
60 Commenting on Chile’s report in 1999, the HRC noted that ‘when planning actions that affect 
members of indigenous communities, the State party must pay primary attention to the sustainability of 
the indigenous culture and way of life and to the participation of members of indigenous communities 
in decisions that affect them.’ CCPR/C/79/Add.104, para. 22. 
61 In 2008 the HRC requested Nicaragua to ‘conduct consultations with indigenous peoples before 
granting licences for the economic exploitation of the lands where they live.’ CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3, 
para. 21(c). 
62 In 2010, the HRC urged Mexico to ‘take necessary steps to ensure the effective consultation of 
indigenous peoples for decision- making in all areas that have an impact on their rights.’  
CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5, para. 22. 
63 In 2010, the HRC urged Colombia to ‘adopt the pertinent legislation for holding prior consultations 
with a view to guaranteeing the free, prior and informed consent of community members.’ 
CCPR/C/COL/CO/6, para. 25. 
64 Communication No. 511/1992, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (8 November 1994). 
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mere consultation before deciding in favour of the State.65 These considerations 
suggest that the HRC privileges a dynamic approach to FPIC, whose meaning may 
vary in accordance with the impact that a particular project or activity will have on 
indigenous peoples. This perception is confirmed by a recent pronouncement, in 
which the HRC noted that when measures substantially compromise or interfere with 
the rights of indigenous peoples, States must guarantee their effective participation in 
the decision-making process. Crucially, the HRC emphasized that this would require 
not only mere consultation but, also, their free, prior and informed consent.66  
 
 
4. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Albeit not exhaustive, the above overview of international legal standards concerning 
FPIC clearly highlighted the uncertainties that continue to surround the actual 
meaning and scope of this principle. The World Bank’s policy on indigenous peoples 
simply promotes a process of free, prior and informed consultation with the 
indigenous communities concerned. Similarly, ILO 169 recognizes the right of 
indigenous peoples to be consulted and to freely participate at all levels of decision-
making when policies and programmes might affect them. Although this imposes 
significant obligations on States parties, it cannot be read as requiring them to obtain 
the consent of indigenous peoples before implementing development projects 
affecting their lands. Important environmental law instruments such as the Rio 
Declaration and the Biodiversity Convention suggest, by contrast, that development 
projects which do not have the support of the indigenous peoples concerned should 
not be allowed, for disrespecting this principle would have negative implications for 
the promotion of sustainable development. Human rights treaty bodies have dealt 
with FPIC in a different fashion. To different degrees, they have all accepted that 
FPIC cannot be understood in strict terms. The endorsement of a flexible approach to 
FPIC has been particularly evident in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
                                                
65 In a similar vein, in a follow-up of a previous individual communication, the HRC first 
recommended that Canada ‘consult with the [Lubicon Lake] Band before granting licenses for 
economic exploitation of the disputed land.’ However, by further noting that ‘in no case such 
exploitation [should] jeopardize the rights recognized under the Covenant,’ the HRC was suggesting 
that, under the above circumstances, mere consultation would not suffice to guarantee the legality of 
the exploitation. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (20 April 2006) para. 9. 
66 My emphasis. Communication No.1457/2006, CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (24 April 2009) para. 7.4. 
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Committee, although this has not been fully confirmed in its concluding observations 
on States’ reports.  
Against this background, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples had the crucial task of clarifying a confused legal framework. The UNDRIP 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, after a period of gestation of 
more than 20 years in which States’ and indigenous peoples’ representatives 
strenuously negotiated its content.67 Contrary to ILO 169, it does not produce legally 
binding obligations.68 However, it represents the culmination of a complex legal and 
political process that led to the affirmation of a number of key rights and principles 
related to indigenous peoples. This, coupled with its authoritativeness and 
legitimacy,69 has guaranteed its prominence among the instruments concerning 
indigenous rights.  
The UNDRIP fully recognizes the special attachment of indigenous peoples 
with their lands. In particular, Article 25 establishes that indigenous peoples have the 
right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their 
ancestral lands. Additional provisions are particularly relevant in the context of FPIC, 
including Article 18 on the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights, 70 and Article 26 on the right to 
own, use, develop and control their lands, territories and resources.71 However, the 
most important provision is contained in Article 3, which establishes that: 
 
                                                
67 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 13 Sept. 2007, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007). For an overview of the content of the UNDRIP 
see S. Errico, ‘The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview’ and ‘The 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is Adopted: An Overview’, Human Rights Law 
Review 7 (2007) 741-759. 
68 On the legal value and overall significance of the UNDRIP see M. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in 
the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 58 (2009) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 957 – 983.  
69 J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra note 10, 53. 
70 ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as 
well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.’ 
71 ‘(1) Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. (2) Indigenous peoples have the right to 
own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of 
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired. (3) States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure 
systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.’ 
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 ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right, 
they have the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.’ 
 
The recognition of the right to self-determination has crucial implications in relation 
to FPIC. In particular, it would seem difficult to reconcile the right of indigenous 
peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development with the fact 
that development projects could take place on their lands without their consent and 
regardless of the consequences that the concerned activities could have on their 
cultures and lives. Similarly, the right to own, use, develop and control their lands, 
territories and resources included in Article 26 would be deprived of its essence were 
indigenous peoples indistinctively denied the right to oppose unwanted projects on 
their lands.  
Having said that, it should also be recalled that the rights claimed by 
indigenous peoples can hardly be absolute. Firstly, in many countries subsurface 
resources are declared by law to be the property of the State.72 This is also recognized 
by Article 15 of ILO 169 and was considered of fundamental importance by various 
governmental representatives during the negotiations on the UNDRIP.73 Secondly, 
and more generally, States strongly oppose the fact that groups within their 
populations (be they indigenous or non-indigenous) may have the power to veto 
development projects thought to benefit the entire country, for this would critically 
impair their ability to control natural resources for the purpose of national 
development. 
 As will be discussed below, this apparent tension is well reflected in the 
provision of the UNDRIP which deals specifically with FPIC and development 
projects. In order to better appreciate the content of this provision it is important to 
consider the drafting history of the declaration. As noted above, the UNDRIP was 
adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. Previously, in 1993, a draft declaration 
was completed by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), a 
subsidiary body of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
                                                
72 ‘Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship to Land’, supra note 3, para. 43. 
73  Several governmental representatives noted that in their countries ‘subsoil resources were owned by 
the State and could not be included within the provisions guaranteeing ownership of land and 
territories.’ Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in its 8th session, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, para 115. 
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Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission).74 The important point is that States 
chose not to actively participate in the sessions of the WGIP. Thus the text of the 
draft declaration was essentially the product of indigenous peoples’ representatives 
and the five experts of the WGIP. A year later, the Sub-Commission adopted the 
document and sent it to the (then) Commission on Human Rights.75 It was only at that 
time that States began to play an active role in the drafting process. In the light of 
their strong opposition to various provisions of the draft declaration, the Commission 
on Human Rights decided to set up a subsidiary organ, namely the Working Group on 
the Draft Declaration (WGDD), with the sole purpose of further elaborating the text 
of the draft declaration.76 Not surprisingly, this body took more than ten years before 
agreeing on a final text of the draft and sending it to the newly created Human Rights 
Council. After the adoption by the Human Rights Council on its first session in June 
2006,77 the text reached the General Assembly, where it was ultimately adopted in 
September 2007. With this in mind, it is particularly instructive to compare the 
original and final versions of the declaration, as this will highlight the areas of major 
conflict between States and indigenous peoples.  
With regard to FPIC, special attention should be paid to the original and final 
versions of (current) Article 32. The original version of Article 32 included in the 
draft declaration established that: 
 
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands, territories and other resources, including the right to require 
that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project 
affecting their lands, territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.’78 
 
This provision clearly provided that no project affecting the lands of indigenous 
peoples could take place without their free, prior and informed consent. In fact this 
amounted to recognizing a wide right to veto to indigenous peoples. Not surprisingly, 
during the sessions of the WGDD States expressed their concern about this provision 
and proposed alternative versions thereof. The language used in these proposals is 
                                                
74 UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1982/34 of 7 May 1982. 
75 E/CN.4/1994/2.Add.1. 
76 Established in 1995 in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 and 
Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/32. 
77 Human Rights Council Resolution 2006/2 of 29 June 2006. 
78 My emphasis. 
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indicative of their more cautious approach to FPIC.79 In essence, States maintained 
that they should not ‘obtain’ but, rather, ‘seek’ the consent of indigenous peoples.80  
At this point, a brief discussion of the dynamics which characterized the drafting 
process of the UNDRIP is needed in order to better appreciate the outcome of this 
conflict. One of the distinguishing features of the UNDRIP’s drafting process was the 
direct and large participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives. In particular, 
indigenous organisations were allowed to participate to the sessions of both the 
WGIP and WGDD regardless of their consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC),81 notably an uncommon circumstance for UN standards. 
In addition, as the indigenous movement was gaining increasing recognition at the 
international level, the indigenous representatives negotiating the provisions of the 
UNDRIP had enough political clout to compel States to constructively consider their 
views. Indeed, States themselves repeatedly acknowledged that indigenous peoples’ 
participation was not only vital but also necessary to the production of the 
UNDRIP.82 This point is crucial to understand the inclusion in the final text of the 
UNDRIP of contentious provisions such as those on the right to self-determination 
and land rights. Obviously, the same dynamics characterized the discussions on FPIC. 
As neither indigenous peoples nor States were prepared to give up their claims fully, 
the natural solution consisted in compromising the respective positions. The final 
version of Article 32, therefore, represents an attempt to bridge the gap between two 
conflicting views.  
The first part of the article simply recognizes that ‘indigenous peoples have 
the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use 
of their lands or territories and other resources,’ and, thus, is not particularly 
controversial. The second part, instead, is significantly more problematic. It 
establishes that States: 
                                                
79 For example, the representative of Brazil suggested that governments should simply ‘take account of 
the free and informed opinion [of indigenous peoples] in the approval of any project affecting their 
lands and their resources.’ Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration in its 2nd session, 
E/CN.4/1997/102, para 280. 
80 E/CN.4/2005/89/Add.2 
81 In the latter case, indigenous organisations had to apply to the Coordinator of the International 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People. Although States had to be consulted before accrediting the 
participation of indigenous organisations, their consent was not required, and ultimately a large 
number of indigenous organisations attended the relevant sessions. 
82 See, for example, the statements of the representatives of Denmark, Canada, Norway, Chile, 
Sweden, USA, Colombia and the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the WGDD. ‘Report of 
the Working Group on the Draft Declaration on its Second Session’, E/CN.4/1997/102 (10 December 
1996) paras. 23-34. 
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‘shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources.’83  
 
At the centre of the controversy lies the interpretation of the expression ‘consult in 
order to obtain their FPIC’. It seems fairly evident that this expression should not be 
interpreted as requesting States to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before 
implementing any project on their lands. Had this been the case, the original version 
of the article, which de facto recognized them a general right to veto, would have 
been preserved.84 That Article 32 should be interpreted restrictively is further 
supported by various declarations made by States’ representatives following the 
adoption of the UNDRIP by the General Assembly. All these statements expressly 
excluded that indigenous peoples could enjoy an unqualified right to veto.85  
That said, it would be wrong to conclude that the UNDRIP has recognized a mere 
right of participation and consultation to indigenous peoples. Representatives of 
indigenous peoples sat at the negotiating tables on an equal footing with States.86 This 
means that States could hardly impose their uncompromised views on any provision 
of the UNDRIP. This per se calls for a balanced interpretation of each Article of the 
document. Two additional points importantly reinforce this presumption with respect 
to Article 32. First, the expression ‘consult in order to obtain’ nevertheless imposes a 
stringent obligation on States. In this respect, it is telling that the expression 
supported by numerous States, that is, ‘States shall (merely) seek consent’, was 
ultimately abandoned. This suggests that excessively restrictive interpretations of 
FPIC cannot be validly upheld. Secondly, FPIC should be read in conjunction with 
the recognition, in Article 3, of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, 
and particularly to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 
with Article 26 on the right of indigenous peoples to own and control their lands and 
resources. More generally, Article 32 should be read in accordance with the spirit of 
                                                
83  My emphasis. 
84 In this respect, it should be noted that indigenous peoples successfully defended particularly 
controversial provisions from the attack of States, in primis the one on self-determination. The fact that 
they could not preserve the original version of Article 32 suggests that States were strongly opposed to 
a radical interpretation of FPIC. 
85 At http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. [last visited 9 March 2011] 
86 Statement of the representative of Austria speaking on behalf of the EU. Human Rights Council, 
Geneva, 27 June 2006.  Available at 
http://old.docip.org/Human%20Rights%20Council/Session1/cddh1_7.pdf [last visited 9 March 2011] 
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the UNDRIP, which fully recognizes the centrality of the relationship with ancestral 
lands for indigenous peoples’ cultures and lives. Allowing development projects on 
indigenous lands regardless of the consequences that they might have on the cultures, 
lives, and, ultimately, existence of indigenous peoples would be plainly incompatible 
with the normative framework of the UNDRIP. Since no provision of an instrument 
can be interpreted in a way that defeats the very purpose of the instrument it is part 
of, Article 32 must be necessarily approached with a certain degree of flexibility. In 
particular, it would seem difficult to argue that this provision categorically excludes 
that at least under exceptional circumstances indigenous peoples might be entitled to 
oppose a development project. Intuitively, the problem with such a reading of Article 
32 is that it does not specify under what circumstances indigenous peoples should be 
entitled to veto a project. It follows that the provision needed further elaboration in order 
to be practically and efficiently implemented. Against this background, the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which will be discussed 
in the next section, has proved particularly useful.87 
 
 
4. The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or Court) has developed a 
significant jurisprudence in relation to indigenous rights since the early 2000s.88 For 
the purpose of this article, it is particularly significant that this jurisprudence has so 
far focused on land rights, providing the Court with the possibility to fully and 
extensively engage with this key issue. The IACtHR has approached indigenous land 
rights in the context of Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights (Inter-American Convention) on the right to property.89 Taking into account 
                                                
87 In this respect, the judicial activity of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights can be regarded as 
being part of a wider ‘judicial discourse’ on minority and indigenous rights that is contributing to 
clarifying the contours of various aspects of the international legal protection of minority groups. See 
G. Pentassuglia, Evolving Protection of Minority Groups: Global Challenges and the Role of 
International Jurisprudence, International Community Law Review 11 (2009) 185-218. 
88 See J. Pasqualucci, ‘The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System’, Human Rights Law Review 6 (2008) 281-322. 
89 Article 21 reads as follow: (1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The 
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society; (2) No one shall be deprived of 
his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, 
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law; (3) Usury and any other form of 
exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law. Text available at 
<http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm> [last visited 9 March 
2011] 
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the most recent international normative developments in the sphere of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, the IACtHR has established that Article 21 also protects the right of 
the members of indigenous groups to collectively own their ancestral lands. This 
groundbreaking interpretation, introduced for the first time in the 2001 Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua case90 and later confirmed in a number 
of equally significant cases,91 essentially stems from the preliminary recognition of 
the special relationship existing between indigenous peoples and their land. On this 
basis, the IACtHR held that members of those groups who are characterized by, inter 
alia, a traditional collective form of organization, a spiritual relationship with their 
ancestral lands, and a communal system of ownership of the said lands, are entitled to 
the protection provided by Article 21.92  
The IACtHR has also affirmed that the protection of indigenous land rights 
provided by Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention must be read in 
combination with a contextual right to restitution. More precisely, it noted that ‘the 
members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or 
lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal 
title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith.’93 
Having said that, the IACtHR also stressed that under the latter circumstance 
indigenous peoples would not be left without protection altogether. Despite lacking 
property rights as such, they would still enjoy a right to restitution with regard to 
those lands. At this point the Court did not ignore the complex question of competing 
claims, for it is obvious that Article 21 protects not only communal properties of 
                                                
90 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Series C 79 (2001). 
91 Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa v Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C 125 
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indigenous communities but also private properties of individuals.94 As a general 
rule, the IACtHR established that restrictions to the right to property, whether they 
affect indigenous peoples or individuals, must meet a number of specific 
requirements: first, they must be established by law; secondly, they must be necessary 
and proportional; and thirdly, they must be aimed to attain a legitimate goal in a 
democratic society.95 That said, the Court recognized that special consideration 
should be given to the needs of indigenous peoples. In particular, it emphasized that 
‘states must take into account that indigenous territorial rights encompass a broader 
and different concept that relates to the collective right to survival as an organized 
people, with control over their habitat as a necessary condition for reproduction of 
their culture, for their own development and to carry out their life aspirations.’96 It 
follows, the IACtHR continued, that ‘disregarding the ancestral right of the members 
of the indigenous communities to their territories could affect other basic rights, such 
as the right to cultural identity and to the very survival of the indigenous communities 
and their members.’97 
Importantly, the IACtHR introduced a time-restriction on the exercise of the 
right to restitution, which will be enforceable as long as the special relationship 
between an indigenous community and its land continues to exist.98 According to the 
IACtHR, this ‘relationship may be expressed in different ways, depending on the 
particular indigenous people involved and the specific circumstances surrounding it, 
and it may include the traditional use or presence, be it through spiritual or 
ceremonial ties; settlements or sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, 
hunting and fishing; the use of natural resources associated with their customs and 
any other element characterizing their culture.’99  
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4.1 Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
Having highlighted the key findings of the IACtHR in relation to indigenous land 
rights, it is now possible to better appreciate how the Court has elaborated on the 
concept of FPIC. As of today, the IACtHR has dealt with FPIC in one case only, that 
is, the 2007 Saramaka People v. Suriname case.100 In this case the Court had to 
determine, among other things, whether logging and mining concessions awarded by 
Suriname to third parties on ancestral lands of the Saramaka people amounted to a 
violation of their property rights under Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention. 
The Court first acknowledged that Article 21 also protects the rights of indigenous 
peoples to own and enjoy the natural resources found within their ancestral lands.101 
After establishing this general principle, it specified that the resources protected 
under Article 21 are only those necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples, that 
is to say, resources associated to agricultural, hunting and fishing activities. Having 
said that, the Court crucially observed that exploiting natural resources that are not 
necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples, e.g. subsoil resources, may 
nevertheless have important consequences on the cultures and lives of these peoples, 
for they may impact on the resources necessary for their survival. It follows that 
Article 21 may impose certain limits on what States can and cannot do also in relation 
to the exploitation of these (unnecessary) resources. This, however, must not be read 
as an affirmation of absolute protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. As the IACtHR 
noted, Article 21 ‘should not be interpreted in a way that prevents the state from 
granting any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of natural 
recourses’ within a territory owned by an indigenous community.102 Instead, 
limitations and restrictions to the rights of indigenous peoples to their natural 
resources are possible, but only under specific circumstances. Following the same 
principles elaborated in the context of land rights generally, the Court found that 
restrictions are possible only if they are established by law, are necessary and 
proportional, and have the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic 
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society.103  In contrast with the case of land rights, however, further safeguards need 
to be put in place. These safeguards are necessary because they seek ‘to preserve, 
protect and guarantee the special relationship that [indigenous peoples] have with 
their territory, which in turn ensures their survival.’104 Accordingly, a State which 
intends to launch or authorize a project affecting the natural resources found within 
indigenous ancestral lands, will have to respect the following obligations: first, 
ensure the effective participation of the members of the community in any 
development, or investment, plan;
105
 second, ensure that the concerned people have a 
reasonable share of the benefits; third, perform or supervise prior environmental and 
social impact assessments; and, fourth, implement adequate safeguards and 
mechanism so as to avoid that the concerned activities significantly affect the 
conditions of the traditional lands and natural resources at stake.106  
For the purpose of this article, special attention should be paid to the first obligation 
listed above, namely the obligation to ensure the effective participation of indigenous 
peoples. As a general rule the Court noted that States have a duty to consult with the 
indigenous peoples concerned. In doing so, the Court held, they must act in good 
faith, provide sufficient information, and respect the indigenous customs and 
traditions. According to the IACtHR, the objective of this process of consultation 
should be the reaching of an agreement among the parties. This clearly means that 
States must not necessarily obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before a project 
may take place on their lands. After establishing this general principle, however, the 
Court introduced a crucial distinction between small-scale and large-scale 
development projects, endorsing the view that under certain circumstances 
indigenous peoples should be entitled to a more rigorous protection. More precisely, 
it held that in the case of large-scale development projects that would have a major 
impact within indigenous peoples’ territories, States have a duty not only to consult 
with indigenous peoples, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent.’107  
The creation of two different regimes in respect of FPIC is in line with the 
interpretation of Article 32 of the UNDRIP offered in the previous section. Indeed it 
is noteworthy that the IACtHR made an express reference to this provision in a 
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passage of its judgment.108 As discussed above, the UNDRIP excludes an absolute 
right to veto to indigenous peoples. At the same time, however, it does not allow that 
States’ interests systematically and indiscriminately trump the rights of indigenous 
peoples. What Article 32 of the UNDRIP does not specify, as noted above, is 
precisely under what circumstances indigenous peoples could have a right to say no 
to projects affecting their lands. In establishing different legal regimes with regard to 
small-scale and large-scale development projects, the IACtHR has sought to fill this 
legal gap. Pentassuglia has observed that the Court employed a ‘sliding scale 
approach to participatory rights’,109 which recognizes that the ‘level of effective 
participation is essentially a function of the nature and content of the rights and 
activities in question.’110 This approach is also in line with the pronouncements of the 
Human Rights Committee that were discussed in section 2.2.3 above. In this sense, it 
can be said that the IACtHR has further elaborated on the flexible approach to FPIC 
previously developed by the Committee.  
Further support to the rationale of the Court’s decision has come from the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People (Special Rapporteur), who has recently noted that ‘the strength or 
importance of the objective of achieving consent [should vary] according to the 
circumstances and the indigenous interests involved.’111  Thus, for example, a ‘direct 
impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or territories establishes a strong presumption 
that the proposed measure should not go forward without indigenous peoples’ 
consent’, and ‘in certain contexts, that presumption may harden into a prohibition of 
the measure or project in the absence of indigenous consent.’112  
In view of such considerations, it can be said that a new and dynamic 
understanding of FPIC is gaining increasing recognition at the international level. 
Importantly, this understanding has its normative foundations in Article 32 of the 
UNDRIP. In the light of the uncertainties that have traditionally surrounded the 
meaning of FPIC, this development is certainly to welcome.  
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This notwithstanding, it is not difficult to foresee potential problems related to 
such a dynamic approach. Instead of providing its own definition of a large-scale 
project, the Court referred to a 2003 report of the Special Rapporteur that described 
major developments as: 
 
‘process[es] of investment of public and/or private, national or international capital 
for the purpose of building or improving the physical infrastructure of a specified 
region, the transformation over the long run of productive activities involving 
changes in the use of and property rights to land, the large-scale exploitation of 
natural resources including subsoil resources, the building of urban centres, 
manufacturing and/or mining, power, extraction and refining plants, tourist 
developments, port facilities, military bases and similar undertakings.’113  
 
The report further highlighted that this kind of projects are likely to cause profound 
social and economic changes in the territories and lives of indigenous peoples 
concerned, including loss of traditional territories and land, eviction, destruction and 
pollution of the traditional environment, social and community disorganization, and 
long-term negative health and nutritional impacts.114 While such a description of 
large-scale projects is reasonably clear, it is not difficult to anticipate problems and 
challenges ahead. Projects such as the construction of large multi-purpose dams could 
be easily categorized as large-scale development projects. However, there might be 
occasions on which it will be more difficult to establish with certainty whether a 
specific project is to be regarded as large or small-scale. Another potential problem 
relates to the difficulty in determining the cumulative effects of several small-scale 
projects. While there is no reason to doubt that ad-hoc investigations could provide 
adequate responses to all the above complications, it will be important to see how the 
IACtHR as well as other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies will deal with each of these 
issues.  
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4.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and FPIC: A 
Missed Opportunity? 
On February 2010 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR 
or Commission) issued an important decision in the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) v. Kenya case.115 The claim was that the Government had 
removed the Endorois community from their ancestral lands without prior 
consultation and adequate compensation, thus violating, among other things, their 
right to property, natural resources and development as recognized respectively by 
Article 14, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Charter).116 This decision allowed the Commission to elaborate, for the first time, on 
the issue of indigenous peoples’ land rights in the context of the Charter.117 In doing 
so, the ACHPR importantly expanded the understanding of the right to property 
included in Article 14, recognizing that traditional possession of land by indigenous 
people has the equivalent effect as state-granted full property title, and that traditional 
possession entitles indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration 
of property title.118 Confirming the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, the Commission 
also clarified that the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their 
traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even 
though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third 
parties in good faith. In respect of the latter circumstance, the ACHPR held that 
members of indigenous peoples are nevertheless entitled to restitution or to obtain 
other lands of equal extension and quality.119 Importantly, the Commission also 
affirmed that the right to natural resources contained within indigenous peoples’ 
traditional lands are vested in indigenous peoples, and held that, pursuant to article 21 
of the African Charter, ‘indigenous peoples have the right to freely dispose of their 
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wealth and natural resources in consultation with the State.’120 Finally, it also 
recognized that, pursuant to Article 22, indigenous peoples have the right to their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
For the purposes of this article, the main finding refers to the alleged violation 
of Article 22 on the right to development. In this respect, the Commission specified 
that the State ‘has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain 
their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions [in 
relation to] any development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within [their] territory.’ 121  Applying this general principle to the case in question, it 
noted that Kenya ‘did not obtain the prior, informed consent of all the Endorois 
before designating their land as a Game Reserve and commencing their eviction.’122  
This decision certainly upholds the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on FPIC that was 
discussed above. It can therefore be taken to support the view that a new flexible 
understanding of FPIC is increasingly emerging at the international level.  
That said, a passage of the judgment does raise some doubt as to the overall 
position of the Commission on FPIC. The latter part of Article 14 of the African 
Charter on the right to property establishes that this right ‘may be encroached upon in 
the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.’ In considering this provision, the 
Commission noted that the ‘public interest’ test is met with a much higher threshold 
in the case of encroachment of indigenous peoples’ lands rights, since rights over 
these lands are closely related with, inter alia, their right to life, to self-determination, 
and to exist as a people.123 In addition, it specified that limitations on land rights 
should also respect the principle of proportionality, so that they should be the least 
restrictive measures possible.124 A further requirement is that limitations of 
indigenous peoples’ land rights must be in accordance with the law. This obligation, 
according to the Commission, requires that States consult the peoples concerned 
before encroaching their property rights, and provide, if necessary, adequate 
compensation. At this point, the Commission sought to clarify the meaning and scope 
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of this consultative process. In so doing, and without expressly referring to it, the 
ACHPR endorsed a radical interpretation of FPIC by saying that ‘[i]n terms of 
consultation, the threshold is especially stringent in favour of indigenous peoples, as 
it also requires that consent be accorded.’125 In the subsequent passage, however, the 
Commission noted that ‘failure to observe the obligations to consult and seek consent 
… ultimately results in a violation of the right to property.’126 Whether in the 
Commission’s view States should obtain or merely seek the consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned remains, therefore, unclear. Considering the difficulties in 
elaborating a workable, coherent, and widely accepted understanding of FPIC, it is to 
be hoped that future pronouncements will further clarify the ACHPR’s position on 
such an important issue.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
International human rights law fully recognizes the special relationship that 
indigenous peoples have with their lands, territories, and resources. Protecting this 
cultural relationship becomes essential in order to guarantee the survival, dignity and 
well-being of these peoples. Difficulties arise when States have strategic interests in 
some of the resources found on indigenous lands. It is widely accepted that in such 
circumstances indigenous peoples enjoy a right to be consulted before States can 
implement any measure. The principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent clearly 
sets out the manner in which the relevant process of consultation between States and 
indigenous peoples should take place. FPIC is now recognized by virtually all bodies 
and instruments dealing with indigenous issues. Whilst its legal significance cannot 
be questioned, one crucial issue remains partially unresolved. By virtue of their right 
to control natural resources for national development goals, States claim that they can 
launch or authorize development projects on indigenous lands without necessarily 
having to obtain the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned. Indigenous 
peoples, instead, maintain that their rights to self-determination and to own and 
control ancestral lands entitle them to oppose any unwanted plan. Different 
instruments and bodies have provided diverse answers to this difficult question, 
leaving the legal contours of FPIC rather nebulous.  
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Against this background, this article submitted that a flexible approach to 
FPIC, which finds its normative foundations in Article 32 of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is gaining increasing recognition. Such a flexible 
approach excludes that indigenous peoples should have a right to veto in relation to 
all matters affecting their lands. At the same time, however, it affirms that when a 
development project is likely to have a serious (negative) impact on the cultures and 
lives of indigenous peoples, States must obtain their consent before implementing it. 
By virtue of this (qualified) right, indigenous peoples can exercise more effective 
control over the broader consultation process, which, it should be stressed, does not 
simply revolve around the issue of consent. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has fully endorsed this view. More than that, it has actually contributed to 
strengthening it by further elaborating on the circumstances which may request a 
more rigorous protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. The Court has identified two 
different legal regimes in relation to small and large-scale development projects, with 
the latter imposing upon States the obligation not only to consult with indigenous 
peoples, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent. The rationale 
behind such different treatments lies in the profound social and economic changes 
that major projects normally have on the territories and lives of the indigenous 
peoples concerned. The fact that on occasion it might be particularly difficult to 
determine with certainty the gravity of the consequences of a development project 
suggests that further elaboration on this matter is needed in order to add clarity to the 
relevant legal regime, as confirmed by the recent decision of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Endorois case. 
 
